USSF Doctrine: Chapter 4
If you haven’t read any in this series yet, you can start at the beginning of my analysis of the USSF Doctrine in my Introduction post.
Chapter 4: Employment of Space Forces
“In the long haul, our safety as a nation may depend upon our achieving ‘space superiority’. Several decades from now, the important battles may not be sea battles or air battles, but space battles, and we should be spending a certain fraction of our national resources to ensure that we do not lag obtaining space supremacy.”
This quote opens the chapter, and in the present day we could absolutely agree with the statement. The quote, though, is from 1957 and helped guide the mindset of our space development.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the USSF has 3 cornerstone responsibilities:
To Preserve Freedom of Action
The four components of national power are all in the mix: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Ability to leverage these components of power in space is only possible when we have the freedom to do so, thus this preservation is first and foremost. Preservation of freedom of action is defined as “a strategic condition where a nation or sovereign actor has the relative level of control or ability required to accomplish all four components of their implicit or explicit space strategy”. Military space forces fundamentally exist to protect, defend, and otherwise preserve this freedom.
It’s worth noting that this mentality requires that military space forces maintain a strategic oversight of the civilian space community.
There’s three conditions which are possible within the space domain. Each might be temporary or permanent.
Space parity: no one force has an advantage
Space superiority: one force has a degree of control over another through which they can block another’s freedom of action.
Space supremacy: one force can act with impunity while denying freedom of action to another.
It’s noted that space supremacy is not always desirable nor should it be the goal. In game theory, it is wise to let an adversary retain a degree of control and autonomy: it allows you to predict actions and not be blindsided. There’s also opportunity for cooperative development if multiple actors exist.
Also, once space supremacy is reached by one entity, it might be impossible to revert back to a state of multiple actors in parity or superiority.
To Enable Joint Lethality
This second responsibility puts an emphasis on communication between branches and operators. The ability to collect and disseminate data has never been more potent since we’ve expanded into the space domain.
Successful integration of spacepower with other military operations has enormous power. This is a system whose design will need constant assessment and updates. This system has the potential to be the most powerful and valuable data/communication platform to exist.
To Provide Independent Options
Since power can be applied directly from space, any and all actions in the space domain can affect national decisions. Any entity or process dependent on space for exercise of the 4 components of national power is subject to the coercive potential of space power.
Deterrence is a dominant factor of the space domain. As military forces shape the security environment of the domain, we can probably count on this escalating.
Core Competencies
The USSF must maintain competency in 5 areas:
Space Security: to encourage partners, not compel an adversary. This competency takes the form of EMS monitoring, launch vehicle ridesharing, protecting lines of communication and supply, building partner capacity through combined training and exercise, etc.
Combat Power Projection: or, “how we get shit done”. These operations are both defensive and offensive. Defensive ops can be active (to destroy, nullify, or reduce effectiveness of threats), or passive (improve survivabiliity through system and architectural attributes). Offensive ops target an adversary’s space and counterspace capabilities in order to reduce their effectiveness.
Combat Power Projection in this doctrine takes an “effects-based approach”. Just as in defense we stand vulnerable through a network attack, we should strategize our operations to maximum impact with minimal effort/action.
Space Mobility and Logistics: the movement and support of equipment and personnel. This has been largely uncontested as man has leapt from the surface, but history tells us that this condition won’t last. Orbital sustainment and recovery deal with upgrades and maintenance as well as reusable spacecraft or launch boosters.
Information Mobility: is self-explanatory and of critical importance. Without accurate and punctual data we lose effectiveness of our command and control. This should be treated as a deliberate mission to be planned, integrated, and tailored with other requirements.
Space Domain Awareness is a big data problem. With thousands of sensors pointed towards the earth and millions more skyward, there is a danger of being overwhelmed with information. An effective process is necessary which keeps actors up to date on factors which affect space operations. This competency is predictive by nature and the collection/analysis/implementation process is self-reinforcing.
Enabling Effectiveness
The doctrine then lists two overarching areas that enable effectiveness of space forces:
Command and Control (C2)
Command and control is “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander in the accomplishment of a mission”. Note that this requires a robust communication system to relay accurate data in a timely manner. Effectiveness and accuracy comes from practiced battle rhythm and rehearsed coordination. C2 is responsible for distributing mission orders, which provide a few things:
guidance and intent: these convey task and purpose (why)
Constraints, restraints, and rules of engagement: these focus on the objective rather than the operational details (what)
This system relies on empowered mission commanders to digest mission orders and determine the how of accomplishing the mission. Bottom line of C2 is communication , communication, communication.
Stewards of the Domain
Military forces should design missions, training, and operations to promote responsibility and a safe/open environment. Especially when it comes to end-of-life missions, space forces must balance this responsibility with mission success. Actors should be familiar with the Law of Armed Conflict and the Outer Space Treaty.
Conclusion
Preserving freedom of action in space is an operational imperative, and should be the first priority. How we operate is done by actors, the Military Space Forces.
